The Office of Audit Services (OAS) provides auditing services for HHS, either by conducting audits with its own audit resources or by overseeing audit work done by others. Audits examine the performance of HHS programs and/or its grantees and contractors in carrying out their respective responsibilities and are intended to provide independent assessments of HHS programs and operations. These assessments help reduce waste, abuse, and mismanagement and promote economy and efficiency throughout HHS.
Notices

THIS REPORT IS AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC
at http://oig.hhs.gov Section 8L of the Inspector General Act, 5 U.S.C. App., requires that OIG post its publicly available reports on the OIG Web site.
OFFICE OF AUDIT SERVICES FINDINGS AND OPINIONS
The designation of financial or management practices as questionable, a recommendation for the disallowance of costs incurred or claimed, and any other conclusions and recommendations in this report represent the findings and opinions of OAS. Authorized officials of the HHS operating divisions will make final determination on these matters.
i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
BACKGROUND
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology
On April 27, 2004, Executive Order 13335 created within the Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) to lead the development and nationwide implementation of an interoperable health information technology (HIT) infrastructure. The National Coordinator for Health Information Technology was charged with developing, maintaining, and directing the implementation of a strategic plan to guide the nationwide implementation of interoperable HIT that will reduce medical errors, improve quality, produce greater value for health care expenditures, ensure that patients' individually identifiable health information is secure and protected, and facilitate the widespread adoption of electronic health records (EHR).
In 2005, ONC established the Health Information Technology Standards Panel (HITSP) as a cooperative partnership between the public and private sectors to harmonize and integrate standards for sharing information among organizations and systems. HITSP has developed interoperability specifications, which define the transactions between systems, including the message, the content, and the terminology for the information exchange. Interoperability specifications also give directions to health care providers about implementing EHRs and sharing information among health organizations and systems. In developing the interoperability specifications, HITSP considered overarching principles and concepts derived from an analysis of Federal and State laws and regulations.
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
Through the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, Title XIII of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. No. 111-5) , Congress reestablished ONC by statute and directed ONC to develop a nationwide HIT infrastructure that allows for the electronic use and exchange of information, specifically EHRs. Important responsibilities for ONC included recommending to the HHS Secretary the adoption of standards, implementation specifications, and certification criteria by December 31, 2009. In addition, the HITECH Act requires ONC to update its strategic plan to include specific objectives, milestones, and metrics with respect to, among other matters, the use of an EHR by every individual in the United States by 2014; ensuring appropriate authorization and electronic authentication of health information; and specifying technologies or methodologies for rendering health information unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized users.
Privacy and Security Protections
The responsibility to maintain the privacy and security of health information is dispersed among several Federal agencies, including three within HHS: ONC, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), and the Office for Civil Rights (OCR).
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General Information Technology Security Controls Versus Application Controls
General information technology (IT) security controls are the structure, policies, and procedures that apply to an entity's overall computer operations, ensure the proper operation of information systems, and create a secure environment for application systems and controls. General IT security controls work together to ensure a secure environment for health data. Application controls, in contrast, function inside systems or applications to ensure that they work correctly. Application controls may be easily bypassed if general IT security controls are missing or ineffective.
OBJECTIVE
Our objective was to assess the IT security controls in HIT standards.
SUMMARY OF FINDING
We found that ONC had application controls in the interoperability specifications, but there were no HIT standards that included general IT security controls. At the time of our audit, the interoperability specifications were the ONC HIT standards and included security features necessary for securely passing data between EHR systems (e.g., encrypting transmissions between EHR systems). These controls in the EHR systems were application security controls, not general IT security controls. • encrypting data stored on mobile devices, such as compact disks and thumb drives;
• requiring two-factor authentication when remotely accessing an HIT system; and
• patching the operating systems of computer systems that process and store EHR.
We found the lack of these and other general IT security controls during prior Office of Inspector General audits at Medicare contractors, State Medicaid agencies, and hospitals. The vulnerabilities that we noted, combined with our findings in this audit, raise concern about the effectiveness of IT security for HIT if general IT security controls are not addressed.
iii
RECOMMENDATIONS
We recommend that ONC:
• broaden its focus from interoperability specifications to include well-developed general IT security controls for supporting systems, networks, and infrastructures;
• use its leadership role to provide guidance to the health industry on established general IT security standards and IT industry security best practices;
• emphasize to the medical community the importance of general IT security; and
• coordinate its work with CMS and OCR to add general IT security controls where applicable.
OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY COMMENTS
ONC concurred with our recommendations and described the actions that it was taking to address them. ONC's comments are included in their entirety as the Appendix. To facilitate the development and adoption of an HIT infrastructure and standards, HITECH created two committees: the HIT Policy committee and the HIT Standards committee. The National Coordinator is a leading member of both committees. The Policy committee makes policy recommendations to the National Coordinator relating to the implementation of a nationwide HIT infrastructure. The Standards committee recommends to the National Coordinator standards, implementation specifications, and certification criteria for the electronic exchange and use of health information.
Privacy and Security Protections
The responsibility to maintain the privacy and security of health information is dispersed among several Federal agencies, including three entities within HHS.
Office of the National Coordinator
Section 13101 of HITECH (PHSA § § 3001(b)(1), 3001(c)(3)(A), and 3002(b)(2)(B), as amended) states that ONC and its committees must develop standards and a framework for the protection and security of health information being exchanged through a nationwide health information network. ONC published an Interim Final Rule (75 Fed. Reg. 2013 (2010 ) containing the initial set of standards. ONC finalized the rule, which contains provisions that address privacy and security protection (75 Fed. Reg. 44590 (2010) ).
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
Pursuant to Title IV of the Recovery Act, which authorizes Medicare and Medicaid incentive payments to eligible professionals and hospitals for the meaningful use of EHR technology, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) promulgated its Final Rule defining "meaningful use" (75 Fed. Reg. 44313 (2010) ). This definition includes the protection of health data and requires that eligible professionals and hospitals conduct a risk analysis of their EHR systems and implement updates to address identified vulnerabilities.
Office for Civil Rights
The Office for Civil Rights ( 
General Information Technology Security Controls Versus Application Controls
General information technology (IT) security controls are the structure, policies, and procedures that apply to an entity's overall computer operations, ensure the proper operation of information systems, and create a secure environment for application systems and controls. Some primary objectives of general IT security controls are to protect networks, computer systems, and data. General IT security controls work together to ensure a secure environment for health data.
Application controls, in contrast, function inside systems or applications to ensure that they work correctly. Application controls may be easily bypassed if general IT security controls are missing or ineffective.
OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY Objective
Scope
We assessed ONC's process for creating and adopting interoperability specifications as of April 2009. We also reviewed the Interim Final Rule for Health Information Technology: Initial Set of Standards, Implementation Specifications, and Certification Criteria for Electronic Health Record Technology, issued in January 2010, and the Final Rule published in the Federal Register in July 2010. We did not review ONC's overall internal control structure.
We performed our fieldwork at ONC headquarters in Washington, DC, from June through August 2009 and from February through August 2010. After the end of our initial fieldwork in 2009, ONC management provided additional information to demonstrate the steps that ONC had taken to address the security of sensitive information.
Methodology
To accomplish our objective, we:
• reviewed applicable Federal laws, regulations, and guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST);
• interviewed ONC staff; and
• reviewed supporting documentation.
We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our finding and conclusion based on our audit objective.
FINDING AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We found that ONC had application controls in the interoperability specifications, but there were no HIT standards that included general IT security controls. At the time of our audit, the interoperability specifications were the ONC HIT standards and included security features necessary for securely passing data between EHR systems (e.g., encrypting transmissions between EHR systems). These controls in the EHR systems were application security controls, not general IT security controls.
We reviewed the Interim Final Rule issued in January 2010 and the Final Rule published in the Federal Register in July 2010. Both documents discuss security in terms of application controls; they do not contain general IT security controls. A few examples of general IT security controls emphasized by OMB and NIST but not addressed by ONC are:
• encrypting data stored on mobile devices, such as compact disks (CD) and thumb drives;
• patching the operating systems (OS) of computer systems that process and store EHR.
We found the lack of these and other general IT security controls during prior Office of Inspector General (OIG) IT audits at Medicare contractors, State Medicaid agencies, and hospitals. The vulnerabilities that we noted, combined with our findings in this audit, raise concern about the effectiveness of IT security for HIT if general IT security controls are not addressed.
ADOPTING GENERAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY CONTROLS
Federal Requirements
We identified the following Federal security standards for the protection of Federal data as reasonable benchmarks to assess the adequacy of the general IT security controls established for EHRs.
Recovery Act
The Recovery Act added section 3001 of the PHSA, which states that the National Coordinator "shall perform [his or her] duties … in a manner consistent with the development of a nationwide health information technology infrastructure that allows for the electronic use and exchange of information that -(1) ensures that each patient's health information is secure and protected, in accordance with applicable law." The Recovery Act states that the National Coordinator should, in consultation with appropriate Federal agencies, update the Federal Health IT Strategic Plan to include specific objectives, milestones, and metrics. The update should:
• include the "incorporation of privacy and security protections for the electronic exchange of individually identifiable health information" and
• use "security methods to ensure appropriate authorization and electronic authentication of health information and specifying technologies or methodologies for rendering health information unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable" to unauthorized users (section 3001(c)(3)(A)).
Office of Management and Budget
In OMB Memorandum M-06-16, "Protection of Sensitive Agency Information," OMB recommends:
• encrypting "all data on mobile computers/devices which carry agency data unless the data is determined to be non-sensitive, in writing, by your Deputy Secretary or an individual he/she may designate in writing" and
• allowing "remote access only with two-factor authentication where one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the computer gaining access."
National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-40
NIST Special Publication 800-40, revision 2, Creating a Patch and Vulnerability Management Program, states that:
Patch and vulnerability management is a security practice designed to proactively prevent the exploitation of IT vulnerabilities that exist within an organization…. Timely patching of security issues is generally recognized as critical to maintaining the operational availability, confidentiality, and integrity of IT systems…. Most major attacks in the past few years have targeted known vulnerabilities for which patches existed before the outbreaks [Executive Summary, November 2005] .
Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual
The Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM) states that general IT security controls are the structure, policies, and procedures that apply to an entity's overall computer operations, ensure the proper operation of information systems, and create the environment for application systems and controls. General controls protect networks, safeguard data, and prevent unauthorized access to software. The effectiveness of general controls is a significant factor in determining the effectiveness of application controls. Without effective general controls, application controls "can generally be rendered ineffective by circumvention or modification." 
General Information Technology Security Controls Needed
Health Information Technology Standards
ONC did not have HIT standards that included general IT security controls. A few examples of general IT security controls are encrypting data stored on mobile devices, using two-factor authentication, and updating (patching) the OSs that process and store sensitive health-related information. For example:
• Encryption is required by ONC interoperability specifications for data transmission between systems. However, encrypting data stored on portable media is not included in a standard, creating a potential vulnerability if unprotected HIT data were copied to portable media, such as a CD or flash drive, and transported to another location. Encrypting data stored on portable media is not included in any HIT standard.
• Two-factor authentication is not required by the HIT standards. Two-factor authentication is a security process in which the user provides two means of identification. Typically, this requires a physical token, such as a card, and something memorized, such as a security code (i.e., "something you have and something you know").
• Patching computer systems, which includes timely security updates and enhancements to protect IT systems from viruses, malware, and other attacks, is not required by the HIT standards.
Lack of any of these or other IT security controls can expose HIT systems to a host of problems. Each year, Cisco Systems issues a security report that encompasses threat information, trends, and a snapshot of the state of IT security. The Cisco 2009 Annual Security Report stressed the importance of patching computer systems, our third example, by stating:
Conficker, the big botnet 2 of 2009, gained traction because computer users failed to download a patch that was readily available from Microsoft. Although most of today's attacks are launched via social media networks, criminals still look for ways to exploit these old-style vulnerabilities.
We found these three vulnerabilities, as well as many others, during OIG IT audits at Medicare contractors, State Medicaid agencies, and hospitals.
Interoperability Specifications
Interoperability specifications do not address general IT security controls recommended by NIST and best practices. For example, interoperability specifications do not address controls on the networks that the EHR applications use. Dr. John Halamka, chairman of HITSP and vice-chairman of the Standards Committee, stated that security is broader than just EHR interoperability standards and EHR applications:
Security is not just about using the right standards or purchasing products that implement those standards. It's also about the infrastructure on which those products run and the policies that define how they'll be used. A great software system that supports role-based security is not so useful if everyone is assigned the same role and its accompanying access permissions. Similarly, running great software on an open wireless network could compromise privacy.… Security is a process, not a product. Hackers are innovative, and security practices need to be constantly enhanced to protect confidentiality. Security is also a balance between ease of use and absolute protection. The most secure library in the world-and the most useless-would be one that never loaned out any books.… Security is an end-to-end process. The health care ecosystem is as vulnerable as its weakest link. Thus, each application, workstation, network and server within an enterprise must be secured to a reasonable extent. The exchange of health care information between enterprises cannot be secured if the enterprises themselves are not secure.
[Emphasis in the original.]
Health Information Technology Standards Panel's Focus
HITSP itself has said that it did not intend to resolve privacy or security policy issues in its standards-making process:
The HITSP SPI-TC 4 designed the constructs described in this Technical Note to support a wide variety of security and privacy policies and technical frameworks…. HITSP has not attempted to resolve privacy or security policy issues, risk management, healthcare application functionality, operating systems functionality, physical control specifications, or other low-level specifications….
[Emphasis in the original.]
Additional Office of the National Coordinator Documentation
After the end of our fieldwork, ONC gave us documents to show its position on general IT security:
• Four documents, published after our initial fieldwork, related to EHR system certification.
• One document, from OCR and published after our initial fieldwork, was on breach notification and the way in which the use of encryption would negate the need for notification. ONC told us that this would encourage the use of encryption.
• ONC provided documentation on three grants that it had funded. We found that two of the grants (posted after our fieldwork) might have enhanced general IT controls because they discussed general IT security, but they did not address the specific conditions found in this report even though the tasks in the two grants included those conditions:
o One grant will establish the Strategic Health IT Advanced Research Projects program, which will fund research that focuses on identifying technology solutions to problems impeding broad adoption of HIT, including HIT security.
o Another grant will establish at least 70 Regional Extension Centers and a national HIT Research Center to offer technical assistance, guidance, and information on best practices, including those on IT security issues, to support and accelerate health care providers' efforts to become meaningful users of EHRs.
• Three documents related to HIPAA security: one was from NIST and two were from CMS. ONC management told us that it relies on the HIPAA Security Rule to ensure that appropriate IT security controls are in place.
Prior Office of Inspector General Work and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
Our concern with the effectiveness of the HIPAA Security Rule is based on work that we did on CMS's oversight of covered entity compliance with HIPAA and the significant weaknesses we found in IT security at eight hospitals. Examples of the weaknesses identified at the eight hospitals included:
• unprotected wireless networks,
• lack of vendor support for OSs,
• inadequate system patching,
• outdated or missing antivirus software,
• lack of encryption of data on portable devices and media,
• lack of system event logging or review,
• shared user accounts, and
• excessive user access and administrative rights.
Our experience with HIPAA implementation in hospitals does not support ONC's position that HIPAA provides adequate general IT security. We also have similar findings in Medicare and Medicaid audits.
CONCLUSION
We found that the interoperability specifications, the Interim Final Rule, and the Final Rule did include some security features necessary for securely passing data between systems. However, ONC did not have standards that included general IT security controls, which need to be addressed to ensure a secure environment for health data.
In addition, ONC deferred at this time to the HIPAA Security Rule for addressing IT security for HIT. Our HIPAA reviews identified vulnerabilities in the HHS oversight function and the general IT security controls. Those vulnerabilities in hospitals, Medicare contractors, and State agencies, combined with our findings in this audit, raise concern about the effectiveness of IT security for HIT if general IT security controls are not addressed by ONC.
RECOMMENDATIONS
OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY COMMENTS
ONC concurred with our recommendations. ONC's comments are included in their entirety as the Appendix. provide incentive payments to eligible health care providers panicipating in these programs only when !hey adopt unified EHR technology and use it to achieve meaningful use.
The HJTSC Privacy and Security Working Group formulated its standards recommendations UlIing the HITSP standards as its basis. Considering the $CCWity standards recommendations from the HITSC, and , UndeT Executive Order 134]0, recognition is !he process by which standards are required to be incorporated in all new or significantly upgraded Federal information systems. ONC's primary mission is to promote thc adoption of health IT in support of improved heaJtbcare: better outcomes, fewer errors, less cos\. ConseqUClltly, in the early stages ofadoptioo effor\>; under HITECH, ONe has wo.ted to strike the right ba lance between ensuring the security ofllealth information among new adopters while not creating such an onerous burden oftcchnical requirements that the primary adoption goal would fa il to be achieved. By the end of the IIITECIl-related wave of health IT implementations in 20 15, ONC expects to have a well developed set of certification criteria thaI, coupled with practices initiated WIder the CMS meaningful use rule. will form a strong security framework for the use and cxcbange of electronic health information.
Adoption is not the whole story, however. There are many health IT users who are not eligible for Meaningful Use incent ives. But unless the entire bealth IT ecosystem panicipate5 in good security practices, the well secW"C could face risk from the less secure. Therefore, ONC addresses security and cybersecurity at the enterprise leve l, with a strategic plan that considen all components oftbe ~ater world of heahh IT. HlTECH required ONC to revise and update its Federal Health IT SltlItegic Plan. A key eienx:nt of that plan is heallh IT security. ONe's Office of the Chief Privacy Officer is in the fmal stages of drafting a comprebell.'livc security strategic plan that details its plans in this regard. ONC agrees wi th the sentiment expressed by HITSC vice-<:hairman John Halamka: "security is an end-to-end process.." We support the visioo of enterprise -class health IT security and have taken clear steps to bring this vision to liuitioll. It is a task neither fast nor casy, but it is one to which ONC remaill.'l fully committed.
Tecb niul Comments
Pal1;e 2 (DITECH, flnal parauapb) '"ONe published an Interim Final Rule (75 Fed. Reg. 20 13 (2010) ) containing the initial set of standards, which SupelSCded the interoperability speo.;ifications adopted before HITECH's enactment."
This statement is inaccurate. The standards adopted in ONC'slFR did not supersede the interopeTllbility specificatioll$ adopted prior to the HITECH Act. We recommend a period be added to this sentence after ·'standards" and the rest of the language deleted.
Page 2, last sentence iDaccurately describes the breach notifi~tion rule. We recommend that it be rewritten to read as follows: Pursuant to HITECH, the InlCrim Final Rule established regulations requiring covcmd entitics to notify affC(:ted individuals, the media, and the HH S Secretary following a breach of theiTprotected bealth infollllltion.
O IC Reco m llltDda tion I
[ONC should] broaden its focus from interopetability spec ifications to also include ~ll-developed general IT security controls fo r supporting s)'S tems, networks, and infrastructure.
ONCRWlOUH I
ONC eOTlCW"S with OIG tbat "general IT security controls" serve an important PW]XISC and are necessary to e nsllfC the overa ll protection of the confidentia li ty, integrity, and availabili ty ofhealth information. As O IG notes o n page 2 of the dra ft rcpon , the Office for Civil Rig hts (OCR) is fCSJIOIlSible for regulating covered entities and their compliance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (H IPAA) Security Rul e. However, in aceordancc with its mission, ONC bas been (and will continue 10 be) proactive in he lping p roviders safeguard the privacy and security ofpcrsonal health information.
ONC has used iL~ authority to rcguLstc the certification criteria and standards for certified health information tec:hnology 10 ensure the avai labi lity of application security controls. ONC will worlc. with the FACAs established under the HITECH Act to actively explore the l'ea$ibility of adding general IT sOClUity controls, such as encryption of portable media and two-factor a uthenticatio n, to the certi fication criteria.
In addition, ONC has developed training and tools, such as the Privacy and Security Framework Toolkit that ONC launched in 2008, and more recently tools and materials streamed OIIt through ONC's 62
Regional Extension Centers who are engaged in !\Ctive outreach to healtbcare providers. These materials inc lude security awareness literature (and soon, a security awarelle5!l video), a detailed checkl ist covering all 10 security domains, and an automated risk analysis tool. Funded products now in development for the REClI inc ludc a security capability assessment. incident response planning and training, and continu ity of opcratioDll training. For health information exchanges (HIEs), ONC is developing an enlCTprisc-class resi liency p lan based on a d eep analysis o f the health information e xchange landscape and its risb and vulnerabilit ies. Tbe above a~tivit ies arc the core eleme nts ofONC's shon-rerm security s trategy, e ffective SeptembeT 2010, with goals to lIIIdress the pressing security issues re lated to rapid health IT and HIE adoption.
ONC bas worked closely with OCR, which has the authority 10 estab lish gcnc:ral lT security standards through the HIP AA Security Rule, on a number ofgeneral IT security issues, including the development of security guidance On how to render protec ted health information (PHI ) unIL<;able, unreadable, and indecipherable for the purposes of the DeW breach notification provisions included in the HITECH Act. To this day, ONC continues to work with OCR and NIST on this efTon .
ONe wi ll continue to f""us on broad health IT security issues and is currentl y working to identify remaining gaps when:, within ilS miSSioDand scope o frcsponsibility, it ean address seeurity across the health IT enterprise with tools, techniques, research, rccommcoo.tions and, where appropriate and within its .",thority, regu la tion.
QIG ReCOmmendation II
[ONe should] use its le adership role to provide guidance 10 the health industry on established general IT secwity standards and IT industry sec urity best practices ONe ReSPOnse II ONe concurs with OIG 00 the importance o f disseminating sec:urity princip les and practicc! as they apply to health IT. As part ofONC's efforts to work with FACAs and relevant Federal partners to bolster security eootrol" will continue to issue recommendations and guidance to the health industry o n health IT security best practices.
J Page40fS
As described above. ONC has taken a leadcr!!hip role in promoting health IT s«urity controls through its educatioll and ouln:ach activities. In additioll, ONe has provided (and will cOlltinue to provide) practical, hands-on security management assistance through the Regional ~tellSion Centers. In addition, ONC participates wide ly in public outreach programs through !<pCaking engagements, conferences, and workshops. ONC cootinues to sponsor health imormation exchange technology, s uch as the Direct project and NwHIN, both of which have developed strong security protections around health infonnation exchange. In ONe Response IV ONC concUJ$ with OIG's finding that coordinatioD among ONe, CMS, and OCR is crucial to promotiDg the adoptioD of general IT security controls for health IT. ONC has coUaborated extCItsively with CMS throughout Stage I of Meaningful Use. The next two Stages ofmcaningfil l usc and launching of the communications p rogram mentioned above will provide additional opponunities for ONe to collaborate with its panners, inc luding eMS and OCR, on bow best to raise the overall level Qfhealth IT security with certification criteria and implementatiQn incentives.
ONe is engaged in on-going collaboration with OCR, fQr example by providing technical researcb and recommendatiQns on emerging security technologies and tec hniques, which OCR has used to infonn its ru lemaking and guidance. In tum, OCR has collaborated with ONe by provid ing input 10 ONC security and cybcrsecurity programs and products tQ insure that our effQrts on security are s ynergistic and non dupliutive.
CQnc lu.~iQn
ONC has an extensive pomol io ofinitiativcs (that are completed, in process, Qr in the planning and fonnulation stages) that seek to prQmote increased security and the public 's Imst in health IT technology and elocU"Oflic health information exchange. In the interest Qfbrevity, we have not detailed all of ONe's initiatives in Qur COl1UllCnts to this O IG report.
ONe thanks O IG for its efforts on this rcport and fQr addressing areas of future growth for ONe's security p rogram. We look forward to continuing to work with OIG to assess and strengthen the u.nderlying trust ,
